

# **January 6, 2021 COVID-19 Follow-Up Spot Check of the Santa Rita Jail Facility by the Joint Neutral Corrections Operations and COVID-19 Expert FINAL REPORT**

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## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Onsite Observations January 6, 2021 .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Findings and Recommendations.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>14</b>

## Introduction

### Timeline:

- May 27, 2020 & June 3, 2020 Initial COVID-19 Inspections
- June 10, 2020 Initial COVID-19 Inspection Report
- July 7, 2020 COVID-19 Spot Check Inspection
- July 30, 2020 First COVID-19 Spot Check Inspection Report
- August 25, 2020 COVID-19 Spot Check Inspection
- September 7, 2020 Second COVID-19 Spot Check Inspection Report
- September 22, 2020 Third Covid-19 Spot Check Inspection
- November 10, 2020 Third Covid-19 Spot Check Inspection Report
- November 6, 2020 Fourth Covid-19 Spot Check Inspection
- December 31, 2020 Fourth Covid-19 Spot Check Inspection Report
- January 6, 2021 Fifth Covid-19 Spot Check Inspection
- February 25, 2021 Fifth Covid-19 Spot Check Inspection

On January 6, 2021, I conducted a fifth unannounced (2-hours' notice at 0630hrs) Covid-19 spot check of the Santa Rita Jail (SRJ). These spot checks are designed to monitor compliance with current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/Public Health recommendations, compliance with current CDC/Public Health Guidelines and the recommendations made in previous inspection reports of the SRJ.

During this spot check, I was accompanied by Assistant Sheriff Madigan, Captain Luckett-Fahimi, Captain Brodie, Captain Mattison, Lieutenant Bonnell, and the Watch Commander, Lieutenant Campos. I would like to take a moment to thank the ACSO Command Staff for their assistance during this tour, and for providing me with the documents I requested for this inspection.

I toured the following areas within the facility: Staff entrance, Intake-Transfer-Release (ITR), Main Kitchen including the kitchen worker breakroom and dry storage, Housing Unit 6 East and West (Male maximum security), Housing Units 8 & 9 (Male Behavioral Housing Units), Housing Units 1 and 2 (Administrative Separation). I also conducted interviews with a variety of staff and some inmates in the facility.

In addition to touring the above-referenced areas, I also met and spoke with Wellpath leadership, newly appointed Health Services Administrator, Michael Durbin (former Wellpath SRJ Director of Nursing), and Natalyn Bergman, Assistant HSA, regarding any changes they have made to their Covid-19 and Influenza A and B response plans, and what lessons were learned from the Housing Unit 34 outbreak of Covid-19 positives that occurred shortly before my January 6, 2021 follow-up inspection.

Because of concerns that the SRJ inmate population is slowly increasing during this pandemic, I also examined the Alameda County Criminal Justice Partners pre-release process for newly incarcerated inmates in Alameda County. I want to thank Deputy Chief Probation Officer Marcus Dawall and Deputy Probation Officer Sandra Villareal for their cooperation and transparency in response to my questions.

It is important for me to reiterate here that I am not an epidemiologist, an infectious disease doctor, or a public health doctor. My observations, findings, and recommendations are based on my expertise in corrections operations, and the published CDC **“Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities”** that was updated as of October 2020.

As a result, I defer to the Alameda County Department of Public Health (“Public Health”) and other medical professionals on all clinical matters.

## Onsite Observations January 6, 2021

### General Observations

As is my practice on these follow-up COVID-19 inspections, I interview staff and some inmates in each of the housing units and conduct random spot checks of cells/dormitories for soap, masks, cleaning supplies, and COVID-19 education materials that are at a 6<sup>th</sup> grade reading level.

All but one civilian staff were seen wearing masks throughout the inspection (a female custodial employee was seen wearing her mask below her nose. This was the same employee that I observed wearing her mask below her nose during my last inspection).

During this inspection, as with previous inspections, the SRJ facility and kitchen/dry storage area was clean and well maintained. The floors were polished, holding cells and safety cells were clean, and Pod dayrooms were free of debris and the Housing Unit Deputies could articulate how frequently the high touch surfaces and common areas were disinfected. In each of the housing pods I inspected, I asked about education materials, soap and mask distribution, cell/dormitory cleaning schedules, high touch surface cleaning, and laundry exchange.

Of concern to me on this tour was the fact that during my Housing Unit tours (Housing Units 6,7,8,9,1 and 2), all the Pods were locked down. My inspection of those Housing Units occurred from 1300hrs to 1530hrs. This is a concern that has to be examined more closely. This may have been an anomaly, but it is in the best interest of the ACSO for safety and security reasons and the mental health of inmates to maximize out of cell time for inmates whenever it is safe to do so. It is also critical that the ACSO strictly follow CDC guidelines regarding social distancing and requiring staff and inmates to properly wear masks at all times while badge staff are on duty and inmates are out of their cells/dormitories in common areas. There may be a rational explanation for this on the date of my inspection, but it deserves more attention and examination. Locking inmates down unnecessarily has significant negative effects on seriously mentally ill inmates as well as the remainder of the inmate population.

### Staff Entrance

On January 6, 2021 at 0830hrs, I met with Captain Brodie and Assistant Sheriff Madigan outside the staff entrance. Nothing new to report here. The ACSO has a well-established Covid-19 screening process that all employees are required to go through prior to being allowed inside the secure perimeter. It appeared to be functioning as designed. With the recent introduction of a more contagious and potentially more deadly variant of the Covid-19 virus into the United States and California, it has become even more urgent for Staff and Inmates to be constantly monitored for Covid-19 symptoms and vaccinated as soon as possible.

In my expert opinion, it is not possible to keep the Covid-19 virus out of the SRJ completely. With 600+ people coming in and out of the SRJ twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, three hundred and sixty-five days a year, prevention and mitigation efforts take on a heightened importance for the protection of staff, inmates, and the

community at large. The real question is what are the ACSO and Wellpath doing to maximize their prevention/mitigation response plan?

Since my last inspection on November 6, 2021, the SRJ had an outbreak of positive cases in Housing Unit 34 in Pods D,E,F in mid-December. There were 74 positive inmates discovered when tested. Wellpath and the ACSO immediately separated the positives from the remainder of the Housing Unit 34 population by moving the exposed to HU35 A,B,C, but upon testing discovered another 83 inmates who tested positive. 35 of those who tested positive were prior positives so the RNA from the virus still could have been in their system. The total number of positive inmates from this outbreak was approximately 120 inmates. In this group of positives, Wellpath discovered 6 reinfected inmates. It speaks to the level of sophistication that the ACSO and Wellpath have reached in combating this virus when they can detect reinfections. (See the CDC December 3, 2020 “Common Investigation Protocol for Investigating Suspected SARS-COV-2 Reinfection”). The ACSO and Wellpath did the appropriate contact tracing for this outbreak and determined that there was a high probability that an asymptomatic Deputy was the vector for introducing the virus into HU 34. I commend Wellpath, the ACSO, and the Alameda County Public Health for managing this outbreak so well.

### **Meeting with Command Staff**

Once inside the secure perimeter, I met with Assistant Sheriff Madigan, Commander Sanchez, Captain Brodie, and Captain Mattison, regarding current SRJ population numbers, available closed-door space for newly booked inmates for medical isolation and quarantine, out-of-cell exercise and recreation time for inmates housed in the OPHU, the Alameda County criminal justice pretrial release process, the ACSO transportation policies, court policies regarding compliance with CDC guidelines, and actions by the Alameda County Superior Court with regard to releasing sentenced inmates from the SRJ early in order to assist in managing the population level of the SRJ.

I was provided with a variety of source documents as to each of these subject areas. As I mentioned earlier in this inspection report, providing out-of-cell time for inmates is critical to the safety and security of the SRJ and for the health of the inmate population. The ACSO currently has an antiquated process for logging and collecting out-of-cell time data that can be unreliable and inaccurate when things get hectic. I do not think this is intentional, but rather a function of not having the appropriate level of staffing including supervisors, and state of the art RFID technology that will accurately track out of cell time for each inmate. I strongly recommend that the ACSO acquire current RFI technology that will allow them to more accurately track and monitor out-of-cell time for inmates. I have previously addressed the staffing shortages in a Targeted Staffing Study that I conducted for the ACSO in April of 2020.

Based on the source documents that were provided to me by the Captain Brodie from the ACSO, I am satisfied that at the time of this inspection, there was sufficient solid door cell capacity to accommodate newly incarcerated inmates. All Housing Unit data for these areas indicated bed availability between 40-60%. One caveat is that the total beds available may reflect a cell that is occupied by one of two inmates. In other words, there may be one vacant bed in a two-person cell and that is reflected in the number of vacant

beds. This does not concern me at this time because the ACSO has the ability to cohort inmates if the need arose. Trying to keep as many inmates single celled unless the need arises to double them up is an excellent approach to mitigating any risk of exposing other inmates to the Covid-19 virus.

Moreover, I am satisfied that the ACSO Transportation Policies and the ACSO Court Policies and Procedures are compliant with CDC guidelines and the ACSO Mandatory Mask Station Orders as they have been for some time.

In reviewing the OPHU out-of-cell time data, there is very little out-of-cell time occurring for OPHU inmates. This is in part because many of the OPHU inmates are medical red, meaning that they have tested positive for Covid-19, others are unavailable medically, and others refuse the opportunity to get dayroom time out of their cells according to the source documents provided. There is so little out-of-cell time occurring though, it concerns me. Because of shortages of Supervisors on the decks, and the antiquated manner in which the data is collected, I am concerned that inmates are not being offered out of cell time in the OPHU regularly. Out-of-cell time in normal times is very important, and during this pandemic it becomes even more important for the health and welfare of the inmate population.

I want to commend Commander Sanchez and her staff for their cooperation and willingness to allow me to look at any and all source documents to verify that the SRJ is complying with CDC, Public Health, and this expert's recommendations where appropriate. It is important for all parties to be rowing in the same direction, and that is occurring here.

### **Alameda County Pre-Trial Services Screening and Release Process**

SRJ Commander Sanchez graciously arranged for me to meet with the Alameda County Deputy Probation Officer on duty who was responsible for conducting Pre-Trial interviews with newly arrested inmates to determine if they can be safely released to the community pending the resolution of their cases on the date of my inspection.

The Alameda County Sheriff, District Attorney, Probation Office, Public Defender and Superior Court have kept the former Judicial Council Emergency Bail Rule #4 largely intact as a way to keep the inmate population as low as possible without jeopardizing public safety in Alameda County. To that end, many arrestees are given citations by arresting agencies in the field and never brought to the jail. Instead, they are given a citation upon a written promise to appear in court.

Most of the newly incarcerated inmates who are arrested and booked into the Santa Rita Jail are screened by Pre-Trial Services to see if they can be safely released to the community while their cases proceed through the court process. The Alameda County Probation Department administers a validated Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Instrument to most of the newly booked inmate population. The inmates who do get assessed are "onview keepers" (probable cause arrests who are not cite and releases), Ramey Warrants (a warrant issued by a magistrate or a Judge prior to charges being filed), and DA Warrants (a warrant issued by a judge at the request of the District Attorney upon the

filing of charges or a grand jury indictment). Those who are not administered a Pre-Trial Risk Assessment are parole violators and federal arrestees.

Alameda County uses the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument Revised (VPRAI-R) which is recommended by the National Institute of Corrections. This is an evidence-based pretrial risk assessment tool whose purpose “is to identify the likelihood of failure to appear in court and the danger to the community posed by a defendant pending trial.” (See Alameda County VPRAI-R Training Manual page 10)

The VPRAI-R uses eight risk factors:

1. Active Community Criminal Justice Supervision
2. Charge of Felony Drug, Theft, or Fraud
3. Pending Charges
4. Criminal History
5. Two or More Failures to Appear
6. Two or More Violent Offenses
7. Unemployed at the time of Arrest
8. History of Drug Abuse

There is also a section in this risk instrument that allows the Probation Officer administering the test to indicate that there are other aggravating or mitigating circumstances that the Probation Officer believes should be taken into consideration in release decisions.

The administering Probation Officer then makes a release recommendation based on all the factors and forwards the release recommendation to a Judge with the Alameda County Superior Court who will make the final release decision after consulting with the other criminal justice partners.

The release decisions are:

1. Release without Conditions
2. Release with Conditions (alternative placement, GPS, home detention, etc.)
3. Detain

The VPRAI-R was not designed for use in this emergency global health crisis in which we find ourselves immersed for the foreseeable future. As a result, in my expert opinion, the Alameda County criminal justice partners should consider adding the CDC Risk Factors (age, chronic illnesses, serious medical conditions and underlying immunocompromised health conditions) to the mitigating factors to be considered when making release recommendations and decisions.



I understand the complexity, importance, and gravity of release decisions, as well as the responsibility of all involved to keep the community safe. However, inmates are part of the community, and I recommend that during this global pandemic the risk of serious illness or death to the immunocompromised and chronically ill inmates in the SRJ who may contract this virus be considered as a factor in release decisions. It should not be the only factor, but it should be another factor in mitigation to be considered along with the other risk factors. Having made that recommendation, I defer to the Alameda County Pre-Trial Services group that makes these release decisions on a daily basis.

In addition, there are approximately 380 federal inmates housed in the Alameda County Jail which are not assessed with the VPRAI-R, and I recommend that the ACSO reach out to the federal court to see if the court is amenable to considering using the VPRAI-R and an inmate's age and health in their pretrial release decisions as well. I will examine the federal pre-trial release process and pending charges against the federal detainees housed at the SRJ during my next follow up inspection.

I appreciate the transparent and collaborative spirits of Alameda County Assistant Chief Probation Officer Marcus Dawal, and Deputy Probation Officer Sandra Villarreal, for taking time out of their busy schedules to speak with me and walk me through how newly incarcerated inmates are evaluated for pre-trial release.

### **Intake-Transfer-Release (ITR)**

As the name implies, this area of the facility is where inmates are received into the facility from numerous law enforcement agencies, transferred out to other agencies, or released to either a community program or the community at large.

I inspected the ITR where inmates are screened and booked into the SRJ. I found no issues with the ITR in cleanliness and process.

During the course of inspecting the ITR, I did notice the addition of what appeared to be a disinfecting machine. Sgt. Barnes explained to be that he was able to procure a Clorox Total 360 disinfectant fogger for use by arresting agencies to disinfect their cars after booking inmates into the SRJ. As you can imagine, some arrestees do not always have the best hygiene for understandable reasons, and they may be infected with the Covid-19 virus. This disinfecting machine being offered to all arresting agencies to clean the back seats of their vehicles after they finish the booking process has been very well received and is a great public service. This kind of creativity by Sgt. Barnes and others in combating the virus will undoubtedly change the way that the SRJ conducts business long after the Covid-19 virus is gone.

I also inspected the booking area and observed the area to be clean and all staff to be appropriately wearing PPE. Mask compliance has always been high, but now it feels like the mandatory mask station orders have been institutionalized and finding a non-compliant staff member is uncommon.

### **Main Kitchen**

On this follow-up inspection, I arrived in the kitchen area at approximately 1030hrs during meal preparation. The male inmate kitchen crew was on duty. A brief survey of

the area revealed male inmate workers on the food preparation line, some male inmate workers cleaning up the kitchen area, and some male inmate workers in the breakroom. They were all properly wearing masks and gloves, but the inmate workers on the food tray assembly line are not able to social distance because the design of the tray assembly machines. Sgt. Barnes has requested plexiglass dividers to be installed between the assembly line kitchen workers in an effort to mitigate cross-contamination between inmates. Because of staff shortages in the facility maintenance crew due to Covid-19 time off, those plexiglass dividers have yet to be installed. Hopefully they will be installed before my next follow-up inspection. I am aware that there have been recent articles in the Wall Street Journal and the New England Journal of Medicine suggesting the use of plexiglass may be counter-productive because the plexiglass may restrict the airflow in some circumstances. However, I do not think those concerns are applicable in this setting. The plexiglass dividers to be installed on the kitchen food tray assembly line will only restrict respiratory drops between inmates standing right next to each other on the assembly line. I defer to Public Health on this issue.

The inmate kitchen workers in the inmate kitchen break room were all properly wearing their masks and social distancing. This is a huge improvement over what was occurring on my first inspection months ago. Currently, as I noted in my last follow-up inspection report, inmate meal breaks are staggered, there are no more than 10 inmates allowed in the inmate break room at one time, and they are required to socially distance.

During this inspection (when the kitchen was in full swing), I observed some food on the floor on the food tray assembly line and some dry goods spillage in the dry storage area. This is to be expected during course of preparing over 10,000 meals a day in a large kitchen operation like the one at the SRJ. I did not see anything in the kitchen area or dry goods storage area that would cause me to be concerned about mask compliance, social distancing, or sanitation.

### **Housing Units 8 and 9 (Male Behavioral Housing Unit-BHU)**

This Housing Unit was clean, adequately staffed, and had sufficient PPE readily available to the inmates who need them.

Apart from my concerns expressed earlier in this report about every Housing Unit being locked down during my inspection, this Housing Unit was compliant with CDC, Public Health and the ACSO Covid-19 response plan.

I continue to be very concerned about the severe shortage of Behavioral Health Clinicians at the SRJ. This is an urgent matter that needs to be addressed right away.

### **Housing Unit 6 (Male Maximum Security)**

On this date, during the time of my inspection, none of the HU6 inmates out of their cells, but I did conduct spot checks of 3 cells in this Housing Unit as well as inmate interviews.

The inmates I interviewed complained that they were not getting the same amount out of cell time as they were previously when they were programming split tiers. They also complained that they were not getting adequate soap.

This Housing Unit has been historically non-compliant with the social distancing mandates and the inmate mandatory mask compliance. I explained to the inmates that compliance with social distancing and mandatory mask orders was critical to their own health and safety, and the inmates stated that it was the upper tier younger inmates who were not mask compliant. Captain Brodie and Watch Commander Campos were present when I was interviewing the inmates in this Housing Unit, and both indicated they would look into why this Housing Unit was still on quarter tier programming.

It should be noted that in my last follow-up inspection report I made the recommendation that this Housing Unit should be locked down and allowed to resume regular programming when they were compliant with the CDC guidelines for social distancing, and the ACSO inmate mandatory mask station orders. However, this should not be seen as a license to lock down Housing Units or individual inmates for longer than necessary to gain compliance with CDC, Public Health, and the ACSO guidelines. We know all too well that being locked in a cell for long periods of time is detrimental to the health and well-being of inmates.

Inmates, like all of us, have Covid-19 fatigue. Masks are uncomfortable, and social distancing is very difficult to maintain in a congregate environment. However, the ACSO cannot afford to let their guard down at this critical juncture. The ACSO has done an excellent job of preventing/mitigating the spread of the Covid-19 virus in the SRJ but must continue to be hyper-vigilant about following and enforcing CDC, Public Health, and ACSO station orders in order to protect staff, inmates, and the public.

### **Housing Units 1, 2, 7**

I inspected Housing Units 1, 2, and 7 for cleanliness, cleaning supplies, soap, masks, Covid-19 educational materials, and found all to be compliant. However, no inmates in the Housing Units I toured were out of their cells in the Housing Unit Dayrooms and no programming was occurring.

It was not count time. No pill call or laundry exchange was occurring at the time of my inspection. There may have been a rational reason why every Housing Unit I inspected was locked down, but the reason was not apparent to me. At the time of my inspection, I did not ask why no inmates were programming in all of the Housing Units I toured. It did not occur to me that no inmates were out of their cells programming until I had left the SRJ. In the future, if this occurs, I will inquire as to why while I am onsite.

### **Wellpath**

During this follow-up inspection, I met with newly appointed HSA, Mike Durbin, the Assistant HSA, Natalyn Bergman, and Dr. Kelly, Wellpath's recently appointed Medical Director.

In Mid-December, the SRJ had an outbreak of approximately 70 Covid-19 positive inmates in Housing Unit 34 (HU34), Pods D, E, and F. The ACSO immediately separated

the Covid-19 positive inmates from the Covid-19 negative inmates by moving the negative inmates to Housing Unit 34, Pods A, B, and C, and they began serial testing. During the course of the serial testing, another 50 or so inmates tested positive in HU34, A, B, and C. Because of the large number of positive inmates in HU34, the decision was made to quarantine in place rather than risk spreading the virus throughout the jail by moving the positive inmates to another Housing Unit. During the course of the outbreak control efforts, 6 inmates were discovered to be true reinfections and a few others who tested positive were determined to still have the virus RNA in their systems from a previous infection. As I stated earlier, the level of sophistication that Wellpath and the ACSO has reached in their Covid-19 response plan is impressive.

The ACSO and Wellpath conducted appropriate contact tracing and determined that there was a high probability that the virus was introduced into HU34 by an asymptomatic Deputy.

When I asked HSA Durbin about what could be done to mitigate the introduction of the virus into the SRJ going forward, he indicated he continues to advocate for the vaccination of staff and inmates as soon as feasible. I am aware from speaking with the ACSO Command Staff that they also agree with the need to vaccinate staff and inmates as soon as possible and are taking steps to make a vaccination program happen sooner than later. During my next inspection, I will find out what progress has been made to that end.

At least one County in California, has issued an executive order making Covid-19 testing mandatory for all staff entering the jail. The order was issued by the County Executive Officer. CDCR has also issued a mandatory employee testing order, and if an employee refuses to comply, they are not allowed to come to work.

While mandating the ACSO staff to take Covid-19 tests is a thorny and sensitive union issue that most Sheriff's Departments are reluctant to take on, I recommend that the Sheriff discuss the issue with the Alameda County Executive Officer and Public Health to see if this is a viable option.

Wellpath continues to maintain their Covid-19 response binders which tracks their initial Covid-19 response and all changes that have been made to date. As I have written in previous inspection reports, what I really like about this concept is all of the policy and procedure changes have been track changed so in reviewing the binder one can readily see how the policies, procedures and practices have changed since March of 2020. In addition, the binder contains the multi-disciplinary meeting notes from March to the date of this report.

The transition from HSA Jen Diaz to HSA Mike Durbin has been seamless and Mr. Durbin is well respected by the ACSO and his colleagues. The ACSO and Wellpath continue to have one of the most organized, thoughtful, and proactive Covid-19/Influenza responses I have seen in the many jails and prisons in which I am an expert.

## Findings and Recommendations

- **Finding:** The Alameda County Pre-Trial Release Process is a sound process and uses an evidence based, validated Risk Assessment Tool to assist in their decision-making. Ultimately the release decision is made by a Judge, but the Risk tool provides objective data and allows the Deputy Probation Officer to add additional factors in aggravation and mitigation to their recommendations. The release recommendations are: 1. Release without Conditions, 2. Release with Conditions (GPS, Alternative Placement, Home Detention, etc.) However, the age and underlying medical condition(s) of the inmate is not considered as a factor in mitigation in the pre-trial release decision making process at this time.
  - **Recommendation:** I recommend the ACSO discuss adding the inmate’s age and underlying medical conditions as a factor to consider in the Alameda County Criminal Justice Partners (D.A., P.D., Probation, ACSO, and Courts) release decisions. There is an exception under HIPPA that allows Medical to share information with others if it is for the health and safety of the inmate. Here I recommend that the ACSO share ONLY the inmate’s age and that they have an underlying medical condition(s) that places them in the CDC “are at risk” of serious illness if they contract the Covid-19 virus. This is critical information that should be considered in any release decisions if possible.
- **Finding:** The CDCR and DSH populations are steadily increasing and are negatively impacting the ability of the SRJ to keep their population at or around 50% of BSCC rated capacity.
  - **Recommendation:** The ACSO is and should continue to aggressively approach CDCR and DSH and prod them to accept the ever-increasing populations of new CDCR and DSH commitments that are languishing in the SRJ.
- **Finding:** Wellpath continues to do an excellent job with their Covid-19 response and adapting to the new reality of a possible influenza outbreak in addition to a Covid-19 outbreak. As of the date of this inspection, no badge staff nor vulnerable inmates have been offered the Moderna or Pfizer Covid-19 Vaccination. I remain hopeful that those vaccinations will begin soon. This is a point in time report. I have more current positive information that vulnerable inmates and staff are being offered vaccinations which will be covered in detail in my next report.

## Conclusion

The ACSO continues to do an excellent job of mitigating the spread of the Covid-19 virus within the jail. It is impossible to keep the virus completely out of the jail with over 600 staff coming in and out of the SRJ 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.


While I am concerned that none of the inmates in the Housing Units I inspected were out of their cells programming during my inspection, I do not have enough information to make a finding or a recommendation in this area.

Finally, with Covid-19 spreading in our communities like wildfire, SRJ must continue to offer Covid-19 tests to staff and consider making Covid-19 test taking mandatory to help detect the asymptomatic positives in badge staff and civilian staff in order to prevent/mitigate the introduction of Covid-19 inside the secure perimeter of the SRJ.

On my next follow-up inspection, I will address this among other concerns I have expressed herein.

## Signature

Submitted on behalf of Sabot Technologies, Inc. dba Sabot Consulting to the County of Alameda.



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Mike Brady  
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Sabot Consulting

February 25, 2021

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Date